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Abstract: Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are a key driver of economic growth as they 
provide agents with incentives to invest in Research and Development (R&D). The importance 
of IPRs should however vary when one moves along the technological frontier as firms can rely 
upon other mechanisms (i.e. imitation, equipment) to bring new products to the market place. An 
emerging strand of literature indeed has stressed how the incentives to growth vary according to 
the position of economic agents along the technological frontier. In this paper we explore 
variations at the intersection of these two factors – strength of IPRs and distance from the 
technological frontier - and show how IPRs relate to incentives for innovation at various stages 
of the latter. Using firm-level survey data for a sample of firms from a group of transition 
economies over the period 2002 to 2009, we provide evidence of heterogeneity in firms’ decision 
to invest in R&D to increasing strength in IPRs as we depart from the technological frontier. 
Specifically, we show that laggard firms in countries with stronger IPRs are more likely to invest 
in R&D than similar firms in countries with weaker IPRs. The effect is mainly driven by firms in 
sectors which make intensive use of legal mechanisms to appropriate R&D. Finally, the effect 
matters the most for firms introducing incremental innovations such as upgraded products, young 
and small firms. The results suggest that IPRs lead laggard players to invest in own R&D, 
possibly by limiting the ability of firms to absorb external knowledge.   
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1. Introduction 
The ability of a country to grow and prosper rests ultimately on the efforts of private 
agents towards increased efficiency, e.g. the introduction of better production processes and new 
products/services. Expenditures in Research and Development (R&D), the most typical input of 
these activities, contribute to the prosperity of countries also by spilling over other economic 
agents: in fact, despite providing agents and countries with better opportunities, the outcomes of 
R&D are only partially appropriable (Romer, 1986).  
A strand of literature in growth economics has stressed how the drivers of growth differ 
along the technological frontier (Acemoglu et al., 2006). Accordingly, investments in R&D and 
the availability of skilled personnel are more important for growth as one approaches the 
technological frontier, whereas imitation (i.e., adoption of existing technologies) is more relevant 
as one departs from it.  
The main purpose of this paper is to highlight the heterogeneous impact of a functioning 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) system on the likelihood of firms to engage in R&D at 
different stages of a country’s development and in different industrial settings. We focus on 
Eastern European transition countries, which have started to strengthen their IPRs systems only 
after the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) came into 
force in 1994 and are still technologically laggard with respect to Western industrialized 
countries. Convergence towards a Western-type IPRs system can be seen for such transition 
countries as a sort of unexpected shift from an approach largely favorable to allow imitation and 
even stealing of new technologies to an approach aimed at guaranteeing legal security for 
intellectual property rights.  
We expect that the likelihood of firms to engage in formal R&D activities varies not only 
across countries – i.e. according to the degree of IPRs enforcement – but also along the 
industry’s technological frontier – i.e. according to the (relative) technological competitiveness 
of the firm. As argued by Lall (2003) countries at different levels of industrial and technological 
development face very different economic costs and benefits from stronger IPRs. Within a 
North-South general equilibrium product cycle framework, Helpman (1993) shows that stronger 
IPR protection leads Northern countries to expand the variety of differentiated products whereas 
it determines a reduction of the rate of imitation by Southern countries. 
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Moreover, exploring variations at the intersection of these two factors could uncover 
interesting nuances in how IPRs relate to incentives for innovation at various stages of 
development. Firms are heterogeneous not only in terms of size but also in terms of 
technological capabilities, and this may lead to differences in their innovation behaviors and 
performance (Dosi, 1988; Cohen, 2010). Thus, given that innovative activities tend to be 
accumulated from learning, exhibited in tacit and firm-specific knowledge, and embodied in 
organizational routines, one may argue that  countries with weaker IPRs systems can substitute 
internal R&D with spillovers from outside patents, whereas these spillovers might be less 
accessible in countries with stronger IPRs systems when they are legitimately protected by the 
originating parties. This effect might be more pronounced when one departs from the 
technological frontier – where the gains from imitation are exhausted – and when externalities 
arising from imitative efforts are more relevant.  
Using 5 waves of the EBRD/World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), a database covering firms in transition economies, we analyze 
over the period between 2002 and 2009 whether differences in the functioning of the IPRs 
systems – measured in terms of various dimensions, including de facto enforcement and de jure 
patent and copyright protection – affect the propensity to engage in R&D activities. The 
empirical investigation, conducted in relation to the impact of IPRs systems along the 
technological frontier, indicates that firms are more likely to invest in R&D in countries with 
stronger IPRs systems and that the relationship between R&D and technological frontier is, as 
expected, positive. Interestingly, we show that this relationship varies according to the strength 
of the IP system. Whereas firms at the technological frontier are as likely to invest in R&D, 
irrespective of the level of IPRs in place, laggard firms, that is those firms which stand far from 
the technological frontier, are more likely to invest in R&D when IPRs are properly protected 
and enforced. Furthermore, this effect is mostly driven by those sectors which rely the most on 
IPRs as their preferred appropriation strategy.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature on the relationship between strength of IPRs and undertaking of innovative 
activities. Section 3 introduces empirical model, data, and econometric strategy. Section 4 
discusses the main results, whereas Section 5 draws some concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature review 
Over the last two decades a number of countries started to strengthen their laws in the 
area of IPRs, following the successful conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement (Maskus, 2000; 
Branstetter et al., 2011). In fact, the strength of IPRs is a key driver of economic performance in 
R&D based growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Eicher and Newiak, 2013; Kim et al., 
2012). 
From an economic standpoint, IPRs carry a tension between opportunity and 
appropriability (Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1969). Strengthening IPRs regimes enable firms to 
internalize part of the spillovers that stem from R&D activities, and hence provide incentives to 
engage in R&D even more intensively (Samariego, 2012). Similarly, stronger IPRs limit the 
ability of agents to access to knowledge spillovers – i.e. through imitating competitors’ products 
– and could potentially lead to wasteful R&D duplication (Murray and Stern, 2007). Conversely, 
stronger IPRs should induce firms to disclose the outcome of their R&D activities, and hence 
increase the pool of knowledge available for third parties to build upon. 
Dialectic considerations of the rights innovators can have over their innovations gained a 
role in the economic analysis of technological change at least since the pioneering works by 
Barzel (1989) and especially North (1990), challenging the standard view that the evolution of 
property rights leads straightforwardly toward increased economic efficiency. These authors 
have created room for abandoning the assumption that a monotonic relationship exists between 
strength of IPRs and innovation. In fact, drawing on the general principles and statements 
sketched above, the subsequent literature has highlighted advantages and disadvantages of IPRs. 
Among the pros, Encoaua et al. (2006) identify the following: i) by granting exclusionary rights 
to inventors, the government delegates the R&D decision and the responsibility of recovering her 
R&D investment in the hands of the inventor; ii) it is implicit in the presence of a (strong) IPR 
protection system the assignment of innovation costs to users rather than to tax payers; iii) in 
implementing an IPR system the government does not need to require typically private 
information about R&D cost and private value of the invention; iv) the information disclosure 
requirement of patents favors the diffusion of knowledge. Among the cons, Arora et al. (2008) 
mention: a) the fact  that the costs of disclosure can more than offset the private gains from IPR 
protection; b) the likelihood that profit maximizing licensing decisions of upstream inventors 
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may retard downstream innovation; c) the possibility that firms recur to IPRs to block 
competitors from using their innovations in subsequent research, thereby dampening the pace of 
advance; d)  the emergence of “thickets” where transactions costs can impede innovation in those 
complex products for which firms possess strong and diversified rights. 
In this vein, the alternative hypothesis that only above a certain minimal level does 
protection of IPRs result in more sustained innovation and long term economic growth has 
gained consensus in the recent years within the field of both theoretical and empirical 
investigation (Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Furukawa, 2010; Gangopadhyay and Mondal, 2012). In 
addition, Furukawa (2010) and other authors (including Murray and Stern, 2007; and Lerner, 
2009) found evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between strengthening of IPRs 
protection and innovation activities. Enhancing IPRs protection thus reduces innovation 
activities when IPRs protection is already strong. On the one side, this suggests that there should 
be an optimal level of IPRs protection which maximizes the innovative effort put forward by 
firms and results in accelerated economic growth. However, on the other side it seems likely that 
below and above such threshold the incentive to innovate and the efficiency of the overall 
innovation system becomes smaller, with institutional factors playing a role in determining the 
inverted U-shaped relationship emerged from empirical studies.1  
The concept of technological frontier has to be understood as “the highest level reached 
upon a technological path with respect to the relevant technological and economic dimensions” 
(Dosi, 1982; 9. 154). Accordingly, investments in R&D and the availability of skilled personnel 
are more important for growth as economic agents approach the technological frontier, whereas 
imitation (i.e., adoption of existing technologies) is more relevant as one departs from it. By 
following Acemoglu et al. (2006), one may assume that, according to their stage of development, 
countries are likely to choose either an investment-based or an innovation-based strategy, with 
the former relying on existing firms and sacrificing selection of firms and managers, and the 
latter limiting investment but supporting rigorous selection of both firms and managers. Within 
                                                 
1 For example, implementation of the national treatment principle prescribed by international agreements, entailing 
equally strong protection for both domestic and foreign innovations, might be incomplete or deliberately pursue the 
strategy of advance domestic technology adoption from abroad (Kumar, 2003; Lorenczik and Newiak, 2012). From 
such a perspective, existence of a non-linear relationship between strength of IPR protection and innovation suggests 
that enforcement of the national treatment may produce negative results in terms of domestic firms engagement in 
innovative activities (Lorenczik and Newiak, 2012). 
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this framework, countries relatively backward in terms of both innovativeness and prevailing 
institutional arrangements may tend to abandon too early the investment-based strategy, 
therefore facing possible losses. In turn, more advanced countries already pursuing an 
innovation-based strategy would take additional advantage from strengthening the institutional 
setting supporting the pursuit of innovative activities. Accordingly, countries may remain 
trapped with “inappropriate institutions” and obsolete technologies whenever they prove unable 
to design IPRs systems and other institutional arrangements in a way that allows them to extract 
the greatest benefits in consideration of their distance to the technological frontier.  
Similarly, firms’ competitive strategies are expected to vary according to their level of 
efficiency. Firms standing in proximity of the technological frontier are more likely to pursue an 
innovation-based strategy, focused on the generation of own knowledge. On the one hand, 
competition at the technological frontier tends to be harsher and based on other determinants 
than price; it hence requires firms to take actions to maintain their lead (Reinstaller and 
Unterlass, 2012). As gains from imitation or absorption of outside knowledge (i.e. through 
reverse engineering or adoption of external technologies via new equipment) will be limited, 
firms will have to strive for own creation of knowledge. R&D investments are the most salient 
strategy to the purpose. On the other hand, R&D investments are characterized by high sunk 
costs and little reversibility, high uncertainty and partial appropriability. Intellectual Property 
(IP) protection hence is sought for entrepreneurs to engage in R&D investments. Comparing the 
relative merits of strong and weak IPRs and taking into account the role of R&D spillovers, 
Denicolò and Franzoni (2012) support this view by showing that competitive innovation 
characterized by high R&D costs calls for strong IPRs and noncompetitive innovation for weak 
IPRs.  
Far from the frontier, however, strong IP protection might also prevent firms from 
gaining access to external knowledge. By considering two dimensions of the patent right, its 
length and its breadth, Gallini (1992) claims that increasing patent breadth can be considered as 
the main driver of increasing imitation costs. Therefore, firms will have to develop endogenous 
capabilities through R&D in order to be able to introduce innovations. 
Micro-level studies on how IPRs affect incentives to innovation along the technological 
frontier are quite recent. Kim et al. (2012) study the changing role of patents at different degrees 
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of development. The authors present two sets of analyses, one for countries and one for a set of 
Korean firms, and show that patent protection is a significant determinant of growth in 
developed countries whereas utility models, supposedly weaker than patents, are more relevant 
in developing economies. Firm-level evidence supports the view that laggard firms rely more 
upon utility models, and that substitute the latter with patents when they develop more advanced 
capabilities. Adaptive or imitative innovations are thus typical of economic agents with low 
absorptive capacities and serve as “learning device” to switch to an innovation-based growth 
strategy, required to stay competitive as we approach the technological frontier. Consistent with 
this view, using firm-level data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for 18 European 
countries, Hȍlzl and Janger (2013) find that the availability of skilled labor, innovation partners 
and technological knowledge result in lower innovation barriers for firms located in countries 
close to the technological frontier. Besides, these authors show that as the distance to the 
technological frontier widens the share of innovators decreases, whereas that of firms not 
interested or in no need of innovation increases. 
3. Model, Data, and Variables 
For the purpose of the present study we use the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development EBRD/World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS), a database covering firms in transition economies. We use the 5 waves of BEEPS – 
2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 – which mostly differ in the spatial coverage. The surveys cover 
25950 firms surveyed 29716 times. 3392 firms have been surveyed twice, whereas 374 firms 
three times. Although the BEEPS was specifically designed to assess the extent to which 
government policies and practices facilitate or impede business activity, it provides an interesting 
array of information on the behavior and performance of firms, including sales, employment, 
investments in R&D, the introduction of new products and the refinement of existing ones.2 Our 
main variable of interest is whether firms engage in formal R&D activities (RD). We use 
question in the BEEPS survey which explicitly refers to R&D investments to generate a dummy 
                                                 
2  Details on the construction of the survey can be found on the homepage of the EBRD under 
“http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/beeps.shtml”. Lee and Weng (2013) provide a short yet 
exhaustive description of the survey process. 
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which takes on value 1 when firms respond positively to this question. Of the 4749 firms for 
which we have information, 1865 (39,3%) indicate that they had invested in R&D.  
The concept of distance to the frontier is often associated to countries and sectors and 
either based on ex-ante distinctions between developed and developing countries (Park, 2008) or 
measured in terms of an income-based evaluation of the level of development, e.g. Real GDP per 
capita or relative labour productivity (Hȍlzl and Janger, 2013). In this work we follow the second 
approach and employ a continuous measure of distance-to-frontier such as labor productivity 
(sales per employee) relative to what we define as technological frontier: the labor productivity 
of the respective ISIC Rev3 Industry in the USA in the focal year.3 We employ exchange rates 
from local currencies to USD and GDP deflators taken from the data section of the website of the 
IMF since information from the BEEPS is expressed in local currency units.4 We chose labor 
productivity because it is a reliable measure of the competitiveness of an economy. We chose the 
USA as we expect that the most efficient productive technologies are employed in what is 
considered the most competitive market around the world. We measured the technological 
frontier as the 5 year moving average labor productivity of the 2-digit NACE reference sector in 
the US, extracted from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database provided by the OECD. 
Closeness to the frontier is measured as the ratio of labor productivity relative to that of the 
frontier. The average productivity of the sampled firms is almost 1/8 of the average productivity 
in the US in the focal sector. As some firms (172 or 3.6%) happen to be above the frontier, we 
artificially transform this ratio to 1 so that the firms are considered to be at the frontier.  
IPRs scores or indexes may prove useful when facing the issue of how stronger IPRs 
systems enhance innovativeness, or when trying to detect whether                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
innovative countries display a higher attitude towards evolving the institutions associates with 
stronger IPRs. We measure IPRs with the International Property Rights Index (IPRI) proposed 
by the Property Rights Alliance, in particular the section related to IPRs. IPRI is based on a 
                                                 
3 Labor productivity in the sampled countries is expressed in real terms and has been transformed in US dollars from 
local currency units. We firstly deflated sales figures by the country-year specific GDP deflators. We then used the 
average of the monthly averages of exchange rates in the focal year to transform the real values in US terms.  
4 Industry specific deflators are not available for most of the countries in this study, so we have to rely on the 
broader GDP deflator. Exchange rates are for the year of the interview, calculated as the average of monthly 
averages. The only exception is Uzbekistan, for which information about exchange rates was not reported and was 
extracted manually from specialized websites and calculated as the average of the last day of the months in the focal 
year. 
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multitude of sources of information encompassing a battery of dimensions of the IPR system 
such as enforcement and patent and copyright protection; for the purposes of our analysis we use 
the release of the 2008 IPRI. Specifically, the Index is based on 1) national experts’ opinions on 
the actual functioning of the intellectual property system and its enforcement; 2) objective 
criteria such as coverage, membership in international treaties, restrictions on patent rights, 
enforcement, and duration of protection as in Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights (Ginarte and 
Park, 1997, Park, 2008). 3) the Office of the United States Trade Representative “Special 301” 
watch list, reflecting piracy rates in the business software, entertainment software, motion 
picture, record and music industries.5 It is hence a measure that combines de jure and de facto 
measures of IPRs’ strength. Another advantage of the Index is the geographical coverage, rather 
limited for commonly used measures – i.e. Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008). The index 
ranges between 10, the highest value, and 0. Finland scores the highest value on the ranking for 
IPR protection, 8.6. Most developed countries vary in the extent to which copyright is effectively 
protected whereas patent rights and their enforcement are quite homogeneous. Transition 
economies, the focus of this study, vary along all three dimensions.  
Finally, we use information about the use of a variety of mechanisms to appropriate the 
returns from innovation from the Carnegie Mellon Survey as in Cohen et al. (2000) and adapted 
to 2-digit NACE sectors in the manufacturing macro-sector.6 
Table 1 lists the countries included in the sample and the distribution of firms which 
reported whether they perform R&D. It shows that there is substantial variation in terms of de 
facto and de jure IP protection across the sample reported in the final column. Countries like 
Belarus, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan do not provide any legal protection for intellectual 
property, whereas most of the countries which have adhered to the EU have modern IP-related 
legal infrastructures. Such high dispersion provides a particularly rich sample, that allows 
controlling for specific country characteristics linked to the level of development and, in 
                                                 
5 The full description of the components of the intellectual section of the Property Right Index and their sources are 
available on the website of the parent organization Property Rights Alliance: 
http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/methodology. 
6 The large number of questions contained in the BEEPS naturally leads to high non-response rates across variables. 
Furthermore, information from the CMS provides limited sectoral coverage. We hence restrict our analysis to those 
firms in the manufacturing sector for which information about the key variables of the study across all sources is 
available (R&D, distance to the technological frontier, importance of different appropriation mechanisms). Missing 
observations for control variables have been substituted with arbitrary values and controlled with a dummy for 
missing observations, to include as many observations. 
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particular, to the quality of the intellectual property system. The largest countries in the sample, 
Turkey and Russia, have most firms reporting R&D, whereas Slovenia has the highest incidence 
– more than 75% of firms report R&D.7 More than 50% of surveyed companies in Serbia and 
Belarus, countries with weak if nonexistent IP protection according to the measure used in the 
study, report investments in R&D. 
<< TABLE 1 HERE >> 
Table 2 shows the sectors in the sample and the distribution of firms performing R&D for 
all the countries included in the study. Most firms are in the “Food and Beverages” sector, which 
represents around 42% of the sample. Economic activities related to metallurgy are also well 
represented in the sample – around 18% of firms deal with metallic production. Firms in 
Chemicals and Electronics are the most likely to engage in R&D; in fact, almost half of the 
surveyed firms in such sectors report having invested in R&D. Table 2 also reports the extent to 
which the sectors taken into account rely upon different appropriation mechanisms in the US, a 
market which is expected to provide the strongest IP protection and where we expect companies 
to choose optimally the extent of legal protection for their products.  
<< TABLE 2 HERE >> 
In our analysis we also control for other determinants that can explain the likelihood of 
engaging in RD. Firm size is measured with a set of three dummies, each indicating whether 
firms are small (SIZE_SMALL, less than 20 employees), 31.74% of the firms in the analysis; 
medium (SIZE_MEDIUM, between 20 and 99 employees), 35.43% of firms; and large firms 
(SIZE_LARGE, more than 100 employees), 32.83%. Large companies, the reference group, are 
expected to be more likely to engage in R&D as they can more easily internalize the spillovers 
from current R&D projects. Similarly, we control for the number of products the company 
actually has. Large firms can better internalize spillovers because they can use results from R&D 
projects on several product lines (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). As most of our companies 
have only one product line, we use a dummy variable (MONO_PROD) which takes on value 1 
when it falls in the latter case. Firms operating in international markets are definitely more 
                                                 
7  In fact, according to the data released by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
(http://www.stat.si/eng/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=3521), in 2009 total gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
accounted for 1.86% of Slovenian GDP. Noticeably, the highest share of GERD was contributed by companies, 
which represented 58% of total sources of funding R&D. 
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exposed to competition than companies which only serve local markets and hence more prone to 
devote resources to stay competitive. Most of the companies in our sample only serve the 
national market (55.46%) and 62.23% sell up to 90% of their sales nationally. So we measure it 
with a dummy (EXPORT) which takes on value 1 when firms sell less than 90% of their sales 
nationally.8 Around 44% of firms have only one product line, whereas almost 33% sell at least 
10% of their products abroad. Whether incumbents or young firms are more likely to engage in 
R&D is still an open question in the literature. We thus include YOUNG, which equals 1 when a 
firm is 10 years old or less. We also control for the presence of foreign investors. Foreign-owned 
firms can be expected to  have access to technology and know-how from headquarters (Girma and 
Görg, 2007). The variable FOREIGN takes value 1 when foreign investors have 51% of shares in 
the focal company, a share which secures control and hence should enable foreign investors to 
transfer technologies and know-how to perform R&D. 11% of firms in the sample are foreign-
owned for more than 50% of their shares. Foreign firms are more efficient as they are more 
likely to be standing above the median of the distance from the technological frontier, 12% 
versus 9% below the median.   
We also include 10 dummies to control for industry-wide opportunities, 4 year dummies 
to control for the year of the interview and 6 dummies to group countries – Central Europe 
(included Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary), Balkans (Serbia, FYROM 
(Macedonia), Montenegro, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia Herzegovina), Baltic (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania), Eastern Europe (Commonwealth of Independent States, Ukraine and Georgia) 
and Turkey. Finally, for the sampled firms, 13% did not report their share of sales from the main 
product line, 3% did not report either the number of full time employees or part-time workers; 6 
firms did not report any piece of information regarding the geographical distribution of their 
sales.  
<< TABLE 3 HERE >> 
 
                                                 
8  The results do not change when we set the threshold at different values                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
such as 50, 80, 100. 
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4. Results 
 We follow the view that institutional characteristics matter in the decision of a firm to 
invest in R&D in order to introduce innovations. This enables us to analyze how, by interacting 
with a firm’s position along the technological frontier the strength of the IPRs influences a firm’s 
decision to engage in formal R&D. Implicit in this analysis is that firms can substitute internal 
R&D with spillovers from outside, i.e. by imitating more efficient firms. Equation 1 is the 
empirical representation of this hypothesis. We first employ a Probit model to estimate the 
likelihood of engaging in R&D as function of the actual distance of firm i to the relevant 
technological frontier, the functioning of the IPRs system of the country j in which the firm 
operates, their interaction, a set of controls X, and a conventional estimating error εi. The 
probability function of spending in R&D is expressed as follows: Pr(RDi=1) = f (DISTi; IPRj ; 
DISTi*IPRj ; Xi; εi). 
In this setting, endogeneity is a concern, especially between the likelihood of investing in 
R&D and the distance to the frontier. Indeed, firms might be closer to the technological frontier 
because they invested in R&D, which shows high persistency over time across firms. Table 3 has 
already indicated that the relationship between DIST and RD is statistically positive. To the 
purpose, we tried an instrumental approach and extensively looked for (two) instruments which 
are exogenous, not correlated with εi, and relevant, strongly correlated with our measure of 
distance from the technological frontier.9 No instrument satisfied the exogeneity requirements. 
We hence take the results presented below as partial correlations and we will interpret them 
accordingly. 
a. RD, Distance from the frontier and IPRs  
Table 4 presents the results of the Logit estimations of equation (1). The key variables of 
this study – distance to the frontier and strength of the IPRs system - are first estimated one by 
one with the controls – column 1 and 2 – then together - column 3 - and finally interacted in 
column 4. Column 5 presents the same estimates as in column 4 with a Linear Probability model. 
Standard errors have been corrected for outliers and clustered by firm to control for the few 
observations which have been surveyed multiple times. Year, industry and country group 
                                                 
9 Mean of the distance values – excluding the focal firm – for each country, year, industry; number of firms 
considered in the survey for each country, year, industry. 
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dummies are included in every specification, although they are not reported for brevity. Controls 
for missing controlling variables are also not reported and are never significant at conventional 
statistical levels. 
<< TABLE 4 HERE>> 
The results are in line with the theoretical expectations. Firms closer to the technological 
frontier are more likely to embark in R&D: stronger IP protection is associated to a higher 
propensity to invest in corporate R&D. Opportunities in the proximity of the frontier tend to 
exhaust as the room for imitation is limited and firms need to invest themselves in R&D. The 
coefficient of the distance to the frontier variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
statistical level. Furthermore, the more confident is the management of a firm that the outcomes 
of the R&D process will be protected by the current legal system and successfully enforced in 
case of infringement, the more likely it will be to invest in R&D. The IPRs index used in this 
study shows a positive and significant coefficient at 5% statistical level when introduced alone 
and 1% when coupled with the measure of distance to the technological frontier. 
The most interesting finding however is the interaction of the latter variables. As this is 
the outcome of a nonlinear model, it cannot be interpreted as in the case of conventional linear 
models (Ai and Northon, 2003). Figures 1 and 2 present respectively a visual representation of 
the semi-elasticities of DIST and IPR for different values of the interaction variable, that is a 
relative change in the likelihood of investing in R&D given an absolute change in the 
independent variable at its average, given all other variables at the mean and the interaction 
variable at the value reported on the horizontal axis. 
<< FIGURE 1>> 
Figure 1 presents the semi-elasticities for changes in the distance to the frontier at 
different values of IPR. The dashed  line – the value of the semi-elasticity – is positive for low to 
moderate values of IPR and then it is no longer significant. The decreasing pattern suggests that 
as the IPRs system provides firms with more control over the ideas generated from innovative 
activities, firms find proportionally less profitable to invest in R&D themselves as they approach 
the frontier. In the most extreme case, the likelihood of investing in R&D of a firm which moves 
from having a productivity of 1/8 of the average US firm in the sector (the average of DIST) to a 
productivity level of 1/5 (an increase by 0.1 in DIST), will increase by 12% in the case of 
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Belarus (or Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz and Tajikistan) where no official IPR legislation is present, 
whereas this will have no meaningful impacts in the case of firms located in the Central 
European countries where the IPR Index scores above 6. 
The results on Figure 2 are more difficult to decipher. The interacted effect of the IPR 
system is non-significant along most of the technological frontier at 5% confidence level, 
whereas it is negative and significant at 10% confidence level for firms whose productivity is 0.7 
or higher of the frontier. The average semi-elasticity of IPR however is positive although non-
significant at the average of DISTANCE. This implies that most of the supposed effects of the 
IPRs system on the likelihood of performing R&D are subordinated to the actual position of 
firms along the frontier. IPRs play only a minor role for firms at the proximity of the 
technological frontier, where opportunities have been exhausted and competition is supposedly 
fiercer, whereas IPRs induce firms to engage directly in R&D even when room for external 
opportunities would induce them to do otherwise.  
<< FIGURE 2>> 
b. Importance of IPRs as appropriability mechanism 
Table 5 replicates the results of the Logit estimations of equation (1) by splitting the 
sample according to the reliance of sectors on patents as effective mechanism to appropriate 
returns from investments in R&D. As mentioned above, we used the responses by R&D labs in 
the US reported in the Carnegie Mellon Survey (Cohen et al., 2000) to identify those sectors that 
consider patents as an effective means for appropriating returns on innovation. The first four 
columns include firms in those sectors where survey respondents indicated that on average 33% 
or more of their products are effectively protected by patents. The sectors are Chemicals (ISIC 
24), Metal Products (ISIC 28) and Machinery Equipment (ISIC 29). 10 
<< TABLE 5 HERE>> 
The results in Table 5 are in line with the expectations. Whereas the incentives to invest 
in R&D along the distance to the technological frontier are consistent between the two samples, 
the degree of enforcement of IPRs across country has significant explanatory power in the 
decision to undertake R&D investment only among firms in sectors for which patent protection 
                                                 
10 The average share of products for which patents were considered effective across sectors is 31, the median is 33.  
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is deemed effective, with the exception of those in which foreign investors hold a majority stake 
(negative and significant coefficient of the FOREIGN variable). Firms in sectors which mostly 
rely on alternative methods do not seem to be responsive to changes in IP enforcement in their 
decision to invest in R&D. Thus, the outcomes of Table 4 seem to be driven mostly by those 
firms which rely sensibly on legal mechanisms – patents in this case given the focus on firms in 
the manufacturing sector.   
<< FIGURE 3 HERE>> 
Figure 3 summarizes graphically the effects presented in Table 5. The dashed line 
indicates the semi-elasticities of IPR for firms in sectors which rely proportionally more on 
formal mechanisms to appropriate returns from innovation at the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th and 
99th centile of the distribution of DIST. The continuous line instead indicates the semi-elasticity 
of IPR for firms in all other sectors. The latter is never significantly different from zero at 
conventional statistical levels, whereas the former converges to zero for firms above the median 
productivity (0.046) and it becomes negative for the top 5% of most productive firms (remember 
that 3.6% of our firms are actually at the frontier, showing the same if not higher productivity of 
the average US firm in the same sector in the same year).   
c. Innovators 
The arguments advanced so far in this paper rest on the assumption that firms have to 
decide whether to invest in R&D in order to innovate. The decision is the most critical for firms 
which are closer to the technological frontier because gains from imitations exhaust, whereas 
firms lagging behind should find it easier to introduce innovations without engaging in R&D. 
Ideally, we would like to know the importance of imitation for introducing new products and 
processes; unfortunately, we do not have such piece of information. We instead restrain the 
analysis to those firms which have introduced a new or upgraded product to the market to see 
whether there exists substantial heterogeneity with respect to innovators which invest in R&D 
along the technological frontier and across different degrees of IPR strength. 
<< TABLE 6 HERE>> 
Table 6 reports the results for the sample of innovative firms, which we define as those 
firms which have introduced either a new (column 2 of Table 6) or an upgraded (column 3 of 
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Table 6) product. We make this distinction in order to introduce an element of complexity in the 
type of innovative activity which is carried on at the focal firm, where new products are expected 
to request more internal inputs and hence R&D. The first column of Table 6 instead reports the 
results for both types of firms. The results confirm the intuition advanced in the paper: firms 
which stand far from the technological frontier are more likely to introduce innovations without 
engaging in R&D when they operate in countries with weak IPRs systems. Conversely, 
innovative firms standing far from the technological frontier are more likely to engage directly in 
R&D when they operate in a country with strong IPRs.11 A numerical example will illustrate this 
point: our model predicts that, among the innovators, the likelihood to invest in R&D is 39.18% 
for firms which are at the 10th of the distribution of DIST (whose relative labor productivity is 
0.5% of the respective US average) in countries which do not offer any protection for IPRs. On 
the opposite, the effect is 47.38% for similar firms in the country with the most developed IP 
system (Poland in our sample). On the opposite, when we approach the technological frontier 
(90th percentile of the distribution of DIST, 1/3 of the US average productivity), the predicted 
likelihood of performing R&D is 47.09% for firms in Poland whereas it is 59.13% for firms 
where IPR is zero (Belarus for instance). The effect is more pronounced for those firms 
introducing upgraded products only as compared to the introduction of new products: firms 
introducing upgraded products in countries with weaker IPRs are less likely to engage in R&D 
when standing far from the technological frontier, innovating incrementally.    
d. Age and Size 
The relationship between IPRs and R&D along the technological frontier is expected to 
vary also according to the age and size of the firms. Young and small firms indeed face liabilities 
related to their age and size, such as limited access to finance and lack of complementary assets 
to appropriate the returns from their innovations, which should limit their ability to invest in 
R&D. IPRs should help young and small firms overcome these liabilities as they provide legal 
protection against imitation and a “bargaining chip” for raising external funds. This effect should 
in turn be more pronounced for those firms standing away from the technological frontier, where 
the risk of imitation and the market failures associated to it are more pronounced. Table 7 reports 
                                                 
11 In general, when foreign investors have 51% or more of shares in the focal company firms are found to be less 
likely to invest in R&D (negative an d(slightly) significant coefficient of the FOREIGN variable). 
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the empirical results for the split analysis: Young (10 years or less) vs Old Firms and Small (less 
than 100 employees) vs Large Firms.  
<< TABLE 7 HERE >> 
The results confirm that the heterogeneity with respect to IPRs along the technological frontier is 
driven by small and young firms.12 The relationship between distance from the frontier and R&D 
indeed is mediated by the strength of IPRs only for young and small firms, whereas old and large 
firms are as likely to engage in R&D irrespective of the strength of IPRs and the distance from 
the technological frontier. Despite being only partial correlations, the results suggest that a 
functioning IPRs system enables a new class of innovators, mostly young and small, to enter the 
market place and invest in R&D. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this work we have presented some suggestive evidence on the heterogeneous impact of 
efficient Intellectual Property Rights on the incentives to embark in R&D. Our empirical strategy 
is grounded at the cross-road between current advancements in the literature on the institutional 
determinants of economic growth – in particular the Intellectual Property Rights system and its 
functioning – and the endogenous growth literature. We have used detailed pieces of information 
from a comprehensive survey administered to companies in Central and Eastern Europe, 
countries which came out of planned organizations of economic activities at the same time but 
which followed different paths of development in the last 20 years and hence show a substantial 
variability with respect to strength and characteristics of IPRs systems. 
Our results confirm the intuitive implications derived from the literature: firms closer to 
the technological frontier are more likely to engage in formal R&D activities and stronger IPRs 
systems, protecting the returns from R&D activities from imitation, are effective in promoting 
investments in R&D. The interesting outcome lies at the intersection of these two dimensions. 
When the strength of the IPRs system is interacted with the distance to the technological frontier, 
its effect is no longer significant, ceteris paribus. When we look at its semi-elasticity along the 
                                                 
12 Small firms controlled by foreign investors are in general less likely to invest in R&D (negative and significant 
coefficient of the FOREIGN variable). 
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technological frontier, it emerges that a weak yet positive result is observed for very inefficient 
firms – the likelihood of engaging in R&D increases by 4.6% (it is expected to be almost 37%), 
whereas it turns negative and weakly significant as firms are at the technological frontier. 
Interestingly, when opportunities are largely available – far from the technological frontier – and 
the uncertainty associated with R&D investments is expected to be lower, effective IPRs induce 
firms to invest in R&D, possibly by reducing the availability of external opportunity and forcing 
firms to seek themselves more efficient solutions. 
Exploring sectoral differences in the relationship between R&D, IPRs and distance to the 
frontier, our findings suggest that the observed results are mostly driven by those sectors which 
rely sensibly on formal mechanisms to protect inventions. Firms in these sectors react positively 
by investing in R&D to the strengthening of the IPRs system, whereas sectors for which other 
mechanisms are disproportionally more effective do not. Furthermore, young and small firms 
seem to be the most likely to engage in R&D when they stand far from the technological frontier 
under functioning IPRs systems.  
These results suggest that the functioning of a sound IPRs system is associated with 
investments in R&D from a wider range of economic actors: not only the large and established 
national champions but also laggard firms engage in risky investments. Indeed, IPRs seem to be 
associated with the rise of a new class of innovators, made of young and small firms. 
Furthermore, strong IPRs are associated to large shares of R&D investors in sectors which are 
more prone to rely on R&D as appropriation mechanism, suggesting that strong IPRs might 
influence the direction of technical change in favor of  those sectors which make use of legal 
protection to guarantee innovative returns (Moser, 2005).  
At the current stage, we cannot give these results a causal interpretation. In fact, we do 
not have exogenous variation in labor productivity, our measure of distance to the frontier. This 
entails that labor distance to the frontier is likely to be strongly influenced by R&D, with a 
consequent simultaneity problem due to the error term affecting both response and explanatory 
variable. However, in spite of this possible reverse causality problem, one cannot deny that our 
results show how a firm’s propensity to engage in R&D is related to the functioning of IPRs 
systems at different stages of development, at different firms’ demographics and in different 
industrial settings.  
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TABLE 1: Distribution of RD performing firms across countries 
Country % RD # RD % NO RD # NO RD # Firms IPR* 
Albania 0.429 18 0.571 24 42 3.4 
Armenia 0.265 68 0.735 189 257 2.7 
Azerbaijan 0.105 10 0.895 85 95 3.3 
Belarus 0.553 42 0.447 34 76 0 
Bosnia 0.540 47 0.460 40 87 3.5 
Bulgaria 0.447 42 0.553 52 94 5.6 
Croatia 0.526 40 0.474 36 76 4.8 
Czech Republic 0.540 67 0.460 57 124 6.8 
Estonia 0.522 36 0.478 33 69 6 
FYROM (Macedonia) 0.475 38 0.525 42 80 4 
Georgia 0.297 35 0.703 83 118 2.3 
Hungary 0.295 76 0.705 182 258 6.9 
Kazakhstan 0.194 55 0.806 228 283 3.1 
Kyrgyz 0.302 29 0.698 67 96 0 
Latvia 0.373 25 0.627 42 67 4.8 
Lithuania 0.593 54 0.407 37 91 5.9 
Moldova 0.414 65 0.586 92 157 2.5 
Montenegro 0.263 5 0.737 14 19 3.7 
Poland 0.375 133 0.625 222 355 6.6 
Romania 0.288 72 0.712 178 250 5.4 
Russia 0.521 261 0.479 240 501 4.8 
Serbia 0.569 78 0.431 59 137 3.3 
Slovakia 0.474 37 0.526 41 78 6.6 
Slovenia 0.759 110 0.241 35 145 5.7 
Tajikistan 0.357 46 0.643 83 129 0 
Turkey 0.310 176 0.690 392 568 5.2 
Ukraine 0.452 157 0.548 190 347 4.2 
Uzbekistan 0.287 43 0.713 107 150 0 
Total 0.393 1865 0.607 2884 4,749 
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TABLE 2: Distribution of RD performing firms across industries 
NACE Industry # RD % RD # NO RD % NO RD # Firms Patents* 
15 Food 879 0.440 1,121 0.561 2,000 18.26 
17 Textiles 94 0.276 247 0.724 341 20 
23 Coke, Petrol & Fuel 3 0.750 1 0.250 4 33.33 
24 Chemicals 162 0.497 164 0.503 326 40.46 
25 Plastics & Rubber 64 0.362 113 0.638 177 32.71 
26 Non metallic mineral products 98 0.298 231 0.702 329 25.44 
27 Basic metals 36 0.419 50 0.581 86 21.25 
28 Fabricate metal products 215 0.280 553 0.720 768 39.43 
29 Machinery and Equipment 259 0.430 344 0.570 603 42.94 
31&32 Electronics  55 0.478 60 0.522 115 29.89 
 
TOTAL 1,865 0.393 2,884 0.607 4,749  
* Share of products for which patent protection was judged an effective appropriation mechanism. Extracted from 
the Carnegie Mellon Survey on Innovation and Appropriability as reported in Cohen et al. (2000) 
  
TABLE 3: Summary Statistics  
VARIABLES ALL IPR<5 IPR>5  Difference BELOW MEDIAN ABOVE MEDIAN  Difference 
RD 4749 0,39 2717 0,39 2032 0,4 
 
2374 0,37 2375 0,42 *** 
DISTANCE 4749 0,12 2717 0,05 2032 0,22 *** 
     IPRs 4749 4,31 
     
2374 3,29 2375 5,34 *** 
SMALL 4749 0,32 2717 0,3 2032 0,34 *** 2374 0,33 2375 0,31 * 
MEDIUM 4749 0,35 2717 0,37 2032 0,34 ** 2374 0,37 2375 0,34 ** 
LARGE 4749 0,33 2717 0,34 2032 0,32 
 
2374 0,31 2375 0,35 *** 
YOUNG 4749 0,39 2717 0,46 2032 0,3 *** 2374 0,45 2375 0,33 *** 
MONO_PROD 4749 0,44 2717 0,42 2032 0,45 ** 2374 0,44 2375 0,43 
 EXPORT 4749 0,33 2717 0,26 2032 0,42 *** 2374 0,23 2375 0,43 *** 
FOREIGN 4749 0,11 2717 0,11 2032 0,1 
 
2374 0,09 2375 0,12 *** 
NO_EXPORT 4749 0 2717 0 2032 0 * 2374 0 2375 0 
 
NO_PROD 4749 0,13 2717 0,15 2032 0,11 *** 2374 0,17 2375 0,1 *** 
NO_FOR 4749 0,01 2717 0,02 2032 0 *** 2374 0,02 2375 0 *** 
NO_AGE 4749 0,01 2717 0,02 2032 0 *** 2374 0,01 2375 0,01 ** 
CSI 4749 0,47 2717 0,81 2032 0 *** 2374 0,75 2375 0,18 *** 
CENTRAL EUR 4749 0,2 2717 0 2032 0,47 *** 2374 0,01 2375 0,39 *** 
BALKAN 4749 0,17 2717 0,16 2032 0,17 
 
2374 0,15 2375 0,18 ** 
BALTIC 4749 0,05 2717 0,03 2032 0,08 *** 2374 0,02 2375 0,08 *** 
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance of a t-test on the means of the two samples, assuming different sample size and unequal variance. 
TABLE 4: Estimation Results: Coefficients 
  1 2 3 4 
DISTANCE 0.6703*** 
 
0.6688*** 2.8256** 
 
(0.2079) 
 
(0.2078) -11.258 
IPR 
 
0.0795*** 0.0794*** 0.0928*** 
  
(0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0313) 
IPR*DISTANCE 
   
-0.3862** 
    
(0.1929) 
MONO_PROD -0.3679*** -0.3666*** -0.3654*** -0.3689*** 
 
(0.0770) (0.0770) (0.0771) (0.0771) 
SMALL -1.3966*** -1.3925*** -1.3876*** -1.3946*** 
 
(0.1020) (0.1022) (0.1022) (0.1024) 
MEDIUM -0.7931*** -0.7758*** -0.7823*** -0.7879*** 
 
(0.0862) (0.0864) (0.0864) (0.0867) 
EXPORT 0.4053*** 0.4448*** 0.4234*** 0.4166*** 
 
(0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0858) (0.0857) 
YOUNG -0.1040 -0.1067 -0.1083 -0.1055 
 
(0.0801) (0.0800) (0.0802) (0.0802) 
FOREIGN -0.1837 -0.1381 -0.1757 -0.1698 
 
(0.1195) (0.1195) (0.1201) (0.1199) 
CONS -0.0618 -0.5247 -0.6779 -0.7743 
  (0.8205) (0.8639) (0.8600) (0.8583) 
N 4749 4749 4749 4749 
N_clust 4468 4468 4468 4468 
LL -2.46e+03 -2.46e+03 -2.45e+03 -2.45e+03 
CHI_2 8.968.898 8.946.735 9.011.057 8.989.234 
PSEUDO R2 0.2282 0.2275 0.2292 0.2302 
*, **, *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. Standard errors are clustered by firms. 
Regressions include dummies for year, industry and group of countries. Dummies for missing controlling variables – 
NO_PROD, NO_AGE, NO_EXPORT; NO_FOR – are also included.  
TABLE 5: Estimation Results – Split Sample: Coefficients 
  Appropriability: Patents Appropriability: Other Means 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DISTANCE 0.7560** 
 
0.7826** 4.8914** 0.5618** 
 
0.5602** 2 
 
(0.3293) 
 
(0.3306) -20.977 (0.2695) 
 
(0.2694) (10.955) 
IPR 
 
0.1091** 0.1145** 0.1413** 
 
0.0115 0.0092 0.0164 
  
(0.0549) (0.0551) (0.0574) 
 
(0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0395) 
IPR*DISTANCE 
   
-0.7188** 
   
-0.2093 
    
(0.3476) 
   
(0.1931) 
MONO_PROD -0.2270* -0.2171* -0.2208* -0.2243* -0.4476*** -0.4502*** -0.4477*** -0.4498*** 
 
(0.1207) (0.1210) (0.1210) (0.1208) (0.1032) (0.1031) (0.1032) (0.1033) 
SMALL -1.4368*** -1.4389*** -1.4456*** -1.4604*** -1.3442*** -1.3513*** -1.3424*** -1.3469*** 
 
(0.1570) (0.1570) (0.1573) (0.1586) (0.1362) (0.1366) (0.1365) (0.1367) 
MEDIUM -0.7813*** -0.7564*** -0.7728*** -0.7847*** -0.7940*** -0.7913*** -0.7927*** -0.7956*** 
 
(0.1403) (0.1402) (0.1405) (0.1411) (0.1118) (0.1121) (0.1120) (0.1121) 
EXPORT 0.4661*** 0.4950*** 0.4751*** 0.4628*** 0.4004*** 0.4234*** 0.4029*** 0.3988*** 
 
(0.1316) (0.1314) (0.1319) (0.1322) (0.1156) (0.1157) (0.1163) (0.1162) 
YOUNG -0.1581 -0.1817 -0.1745 -0.1708 -0.0707 -0.0653 -0.0708 -0.0686 
 
(0.1225) (0.1223) (0.1227) (0.1231) (0.1073) (0.1071) (0.1074) (0.1073) 
FOREIGN -0.5383*** -0.4554** -0.5008*** -0.4937** 0.0717 0.1018 0.0712 0.0747 
 
(0.1906) (0.1900) (0.1914) (0.1922) (0.1552) (0.1546) (0.1555) (0.1553) 
CONS 0.2182 -0.3246 -0.5122 -0.7613 -0.0384 -0.0115 -0.1127 -0.1563 
  (0.3438) (0.4796) (0.4880) (0.5070) (0.8483) (0.9044) (0.9045) (0.9034) 
N 1699 1699 1699 1699 3048 3048 3048 3048 
N_clust 1622 1622 1622 1622 2896 2896 2896 2896 
LL -984.3889 -985.1063 -982.0323 -978.3535 -1.44e+03 -1.45e+03 -1.44e+03 -1.44e+03 
CHI_2 253.0906 250.6678 255.4275 256.8893 693.2072 690.9160 695.0003 693.3913 
PSEUDO R2 0.1249 0.1243 0.1270 0.1303 0.2965 0.2955 0.2965 0.2968 
*, **, *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. Standard errors are clustered by firms. Regressions include dummies for year, industry and 
group of countries. Dummies for missing controlling variables – NO_PROD, NO_AGE, NO_EXPORT; NO_FOR – are also included.
TABLE 6: Estimation Results: Innovative Sample: Coefficients 
 All Innovators New Products Upgraded Product 
  1 2 3 
DISTANCE 3.0895*** 2.4094* 3.9975*** 
 
-11.755 -13.998 -11.749 
IPR 0.0774** 0.0991*** 0.0881** 
 
(0.0334) (0.0384) (0.0350) 
IPR*DISTANCE -0.4528** -0.3503 -0.5932*** 
 
(0.2002) (0.2381) (0.2000) 
MONO_PROD -0.3117*** -0.2110** -0.3516*** 
 
(0.0850) (0.1006) (0.0876) 
SMALL -1.2424*** -1.1839*** -1.2068*** 
 
(0.1105) (0.1270) (0.1137) 
MEDIUM -0.7836*** -0.7753*** -0.7667*** 
 
(0.0935) (0.1089) (0.0966) 
EXPORT 0.4531*** 0.4437*** 0.4590*** 
 
(0.0931) (0.1086) (0.0966) 
YOUNG -0.1093 -0.0572 -0.1247 
 
(0.0880) (0.1015) (0.0918) 
FOREIGN -0.2509* -0.2843* -0.2922** 
 
(0.1296) (0.1533) (0.1342) 
CONS -0.6356 -0.4440 -0.5777 
  (0.8733) (0.9023) (0.8759) 
N 3700 2664 34.13 
N_clust 3507 2552 3242 
LL -2.01e+03 -1.48e+03 -1.87e+03 
CHI_2 693.3189 463.9904 646.2581 
PSEUDO R2 0.2106 0.1987 0.2057 
*, **, *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. Standard errors are clustered by firms. 
Regressions include dummies for year, industry and group of countries. Dummies for missing controlling variables – 
NO_PROD, NO_AGE, NO_EXPORT; NO_FOR – are also included.  
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TABLE 7: Estimation Results: Young and SMes: Coefficients 
 YOUNG OLD SMEs LARGE 
 
1 2 3 4 
DISTANCE 4.8505*** 2.0183* 3.5940*** 1.6846 
 
(1.6798) -(1.839) (1.1237) (1.4599) 
IPR 0.1286** 0.0577 0.1603*** 0.0416 
 
(0.0508) (0.0404) (0.0434) (0.0463) 
IPR*DISTANCE -0.7785*** -0.2259 -0.5074*** -0.2265 
 
(0.2871) (0.2041) (0.1946) (0.2521) 
MONO_PROD -0.4167*** -0.3328*** -0.4320*** -0.3556*** 
 
(0.1326) (0.0954) (0.0987) (0.1307) 
SMALL -1.3319*** -1.4956*** -0.5834*** 
 
 
(0.1817) (0.1296) (0.0973) 
 
MEDIUM -0.7837*** -0.7948*** 
  
 
(0.1666) (0.1028) 
  
EXPORT 0.4285*** 0.4175*** 0.5354*** 0.2737** 
 
(0.1623) (0.1016) (0.1140) (0.1311) 
YOUNG 
  
0.0184 -0.2187 
 
  
(0.0987) (0.1447) 
FOREIGN -0.2988 -0.1951 -0.5025** -0.0955 
 
(0.2002) (0.1625) (0.1995) (0.1667) 
CONS -0.1280 -10516 -0.8766* -0.3020 
  (1.1124) (1.0913) (0.4514) (13059 
N 1842 2906 3187 1558 
N_clust 1792 2775 3009 1476 
LL -8589352 -1.58e+03 -1.52e+03 -8731974 
CHI_2 4270712 5236309 5635940 2328954 
PSEUDO R2 0.2961 0.1954 0.2201 0.1766 
*, **, *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. Standard errors are clustered by firms. 
Regressions include dummies for year, industry and group of countries. Dummies for missing controlling variables – 
NO_PROD, NO_AGE, NO_EXPORT; NO_FOR – are also included.  
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FIGURE 1: Semi-elasticity (ey/dx) of DIST at different values of IPR. Confidence band at 95%. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Semi-elasticity (ey/dx) of IPR at different values of DIST. Confidence band at 95%. 
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FIGURE 3: Semi-elasticity (ey/dx) of IPR at different values of DIST – Split sample 
 
The continuous line traces the effects of IPR for the sample of firms which rely proportionately more upon patents 
as mechanism to appropriate returns form innovation whereas the dashed line plots the effect of IPR for the rest of 
firms.  
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